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Literature on the ‘power of words’ has emphasized the importance of a firm’s corporate communication as a source
of legitimacy and reputation in the eyes of its stakeholders. We argue that it is not just the content or style of a firm’s
communication about its strategy, but also the alignment between this communication and its subsequent strategic
actions that help build legitimacy among stakeholders and creating firm performance. We introduce the
organization-level construct of ‘strategic integrity’ to capture the notion of alignment between a firm’s strategy
communication and its subsequent strategic actions. We investigate the importance of strategic integrity using the
case of the German pharmaceuticals firm Bayer AG in the context of its portfolio restructuring. The results of an event
study of 80 acquisitions/divestments indicate that stock markets react positively to strategic integrity.
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Introduction
The emerging school of ‘rhetorical institutionalism’
suggests that communication plays a central role in the
process through which economic actors establish and
maintain legitimacy (Green and Li, 2011; Harmon
et al., 2015; Hoefer and Green, 2016). Building on the
insight by institutional theorists that communication
shapes legitimacy formation (Suddaby and Greenwood,
2005; Golant and Sillince, 2007; Suddaby, 2010),
researchers have identified rhetorical strategies including
framing (Gray et al., 2015), narratives (Andersen and
Rask, 2014) and tropes (Etzion and Ferraro, 2010) as
means to establish perceived legitimacy (Bitektine and
Haack, 2015).
At the same time, the literature on rhetorical
institutionalism has paid scant attention to the argument
that mere rhetoric is rarely enough in order for economic
actors to sustain their reputation and the legitimacy
attributed to them, unless it is backed by concrete action.
Simons, (1999, 2002a, b) has introduced the notion of
behavioral integrity, defined as the extent to which an
individual’s communication regarding her intentions are
matched by her subsequent actions and behaviors. Recent
meta-analytical work has attested to the positive effects of
behavioral integrity on leader-follower relationships and
managerial effectiveness (Simons et al., 2015). However,
empirical research on behavioral integrity has studied this
concept exclusively on the level of individual human
actors, whereas its importance in the case of organizations
has largely escaped attention.
In this paper, we follow three avenues in order to help
making a contribution for overcome these limitations.
First, we develop the notion of ‘strategic integrity’ as a
novel construct to describe the pattern of alignment
between a firm’s communicated strategy and its
subsequent strategic actions. The notion of strategic
integrity thus provides a middle ground between
approaches that emphasize communication (‘words’) over
actions (‘deeds’), and those that see the order of priority
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the other way around. Strategic integrity, as defined here,
does not relate to the question of whether firms’ intentions
or actions are ‘good’ from an ethical or a competitive point
of view. Instead, it focuses on whether its actions are in
line with its stated intentions, such that the latter can be
taken as a reliable guide for the former.
Second, we explicate the notion of strategic integrity in
the context of a firm’s portfolio restructuring actions.
Acquisitions and divestitures involve highly tangible and
visible resource commitments through which firms
implement their strategic objectives on the corporate level
(Noda and Bower, 1996). We offer theory suggesting that
strategic integrity in the context of corporate restructuring
will lead shareholders – a stakeholder group that has an
acute interest in the firm’s corporate strategy – to attribute
a reputation for trustworthiness and reliability to the firm,
thus raising their evaluation of the firm concerned.
Third, we present the case of Bayer, a German
chemicals and pharmaceuticals company, in order to
explore shareholders’ reactions to strategic integrity
empirically. We propose a measure of strategic integrity
involving secondary data and conduct an event study to
assess Bayer’s strategic integrity. Between 1999 and
2006, Bayer conducted a large-scale restructuring of its
business portfolio in the context of its move away from
its traditional chemicals business towards a greater focus
on its healthcare and agriculture divisions (Bayer, 2016).
Our event study analysis of 80 corporate transactions
shows that those resource allocation decisions
characterized by strategic integrity carry positive
abnormal returns, implying that the construct of strategic
integrity is of empirical relevance.
In the following, we review the literature on the
importance of strategy communication for organizational
legitimacy from the perspective of institutional theory
and provide a critique of this perspective. We then
develop the construct of strategic integrity, and explicate
it in the specific context of Bayer’s communication and
corporate restructuring activities. We develop a measure
for strategic integrity and test its implications for capital
market valuation. We conclude by discussing of our
contribution and the limitations of our work, and provide
directions for future research on strategic integrity.
Literature review
Institutional perspectives on legitimacy and corporate
communication
Institutional theory proposes that firms operate within a
social framework of norms, values and beliefs about
appropriate and acceptable economic behavior (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Deephouse and Suchman,
2008). Specifically, firms require legitimacy, defined as
‘the generalized perception or assumption that the
actions of an entity are desirable, or appropriate within
some constructed system of norms, values, beliefs
and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: 574). A firm cannot
claim legitimacy; it is socially constructed (Kostova and
Zaheer, 1999) and ascribed to the organization by its
stakeholders (Massey, 2001). Legitimacy enables an
organization to maintain the willingness of its
stakeholders to provide it with essential resources
(Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). Empirical research has found
legitimacy to enhance stakeholder support (Zuckerman,
2000; Choi and Shepherd, 2005) and firm performance
(e.g., Choi and Wang, 2009).
The strategic approach to legitimacy highlights the
capacity of an organization to influence the propensity
of its key stakeholders to ascribe legitimacy to it, through
passive compliance or active manipulation (Deephouse
and Suchman, 2008). Since legitimacy can have many
sources with different expectations and evaluation
standards (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012), stakeholder
heterogeneity tends to complicate gaining legitimacy
(Prottas, 2013).
In recent years, a growing body of literature from the
‘rhetorical institutionalism’ perspective has addressed
the relevance of communication and rhetoric – the skilled
use of language for persuasion (Covaleski et al., 2003) –
in the legitimization process (Suddaby and Greenwood,
2005; Harmon et al., 2015). A related stream of literature
emphasizes the role of discourse and of particular
discursive strategies for building legitimacy (Phillips
et al., 2004; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Monin, 2010;
Lefsrud and Meyer, 2012; Joutsenvirta and Vaara,
2015). Empirical research has found framing (Fiss and
Zajac, 2006; Lefsrud and Meyer, 2012; Gray et al.,
2015), narratives (Golant and Sillince, 2007; Andersen
and Rask, 2014), and tropes to influence legitimacy
formation (Etzion and Ferraro, 2010). Cornelissen et al.
(2015) have called for putting communication at the heart
of institutional theory.
The literature on rhetorical institutionalism ties in
with the argument that corporate communication plays a
key role in managing and influencing stakeholders
(Cornelissen et al., 2006; Neill, 2015). By communicating
with their stakeholders, firms act as sense givers (Gioia
and Chittipeddi, 1991), helping them to build reputation,
trust, credibility, and ultimately legitimacy among
stakeholders (Pfeffer and Pfeffer, 1981; Suchman, 1995;
Stephens et al., 2005; Erickson et al., 2011). For example,
Zajac and Westphal (2004) found that communication
about an action enhanced the creation of legitimacy for
that action.
As organizations define specific legitimization
strategies for their various stakeholder groups, they need
to adjust their communication approaches accordingly
(Massey, 2001). A significant body of literature exists
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on corporate communication and reputation building
among external stakeholders, such as customers (Foreman
and Argenti, 2005) and investors (Dolphin, 2004), as well
as internal stakeholders (Welch and Jackson, 2007). In
particular the literature on corporate social responsibility
has discussed stakeholder communication at length
(Hooghiemstra, 2000; Bansal and Clelland, 2004;Wagner
et al., 2009). This literature builds on earlier research on
strategy communication which has assessed how
corporate communication creates positive strategic
images, credibility, and reputation among important
stakeholders such as investors, competitors and
employees (Diffenbach and Higgins, 1987; Higgins and
Diffenbach, 1989a, b; Higgins and Bannister, 1992;
Mahon and Wartick, 2003).
In sum, the literature reviewed so far emphasizes both
the form and the content of corporate communication for
the purposes of gaining legitimacy, and for influencing
specific stakeholder groups to become more favorably
disposed towards the firm. However, this literature has
paid scant attention to the question of what firms actually
do, and on whether their actions are consistent with their
stated intentions. According to Rindova and Fombrun
(1999), this consistency between intentions and
subsequent actions is central to firms’ efforts to maintain
legitimacy. Following this idea, we propose that
stakeholder evaluations of a firm will be influenced by
the extent to which it follows through with its intentions
previously announced, and implements its propagated
strategies. We first discuss the notion of behavioral
integrity which captures this idea on the individual level,
before transposing it to the organizational level by
introducing the notion of strategic integrity.
The importance of behavioral integrity
Behavioral integrity refers to the ‘pattern of alignment
between an actor’s words and deeds’ (Simons, 2002a, b:
19). Thus defined, behavioral integrity does not reflect
whether the actor takes the ‘right’ actions (e.g., their moral
content), or whether the observer approves of them, but
rather whether the patterns of the actor’s actions and
behaviors are consistent with her claims. Although
Simons (2002a, b) explicitly conceptualized behavioral
integrity as a construct of relevance for multiple levels of
analysis, extant applications and empirical investigations
of the behavioral integrity construct have focused
exclusively on individual rather than on collective actors
such as organizations. Subsequent research has been
particularly interested in understanding behavioral
integrity in leader-follower-relationships (Simons et al.,
2011,2015). Typical examples of the effects of behavioral
integrity include the creation of trust (Simons et al., 2007;
Palanski et al., 2011; Palanski and Yammarino, 2011;
Kannan-Narasimhan and Lawrence, 2012), follower
wellbeing (Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly, 2003; Prottas,
2008, 2013; Andrews et al., 2015), and health (Leroy
et al., 2012). The behavioral integrity of leaders has been
shown to decrease levels of follower absenteeism
(Johnson and O’Leary-Kelly, 2003) and turnover (Simons
et al., 2007), and to enhance performance (Johnson and
O’Leary-Kelly, 2003; Palanski et al., 2011; Leroy et al.,
2012). It has also been found to favorably affect
employees’ judgments about their managers (Dineen
et al., 2006; Kannan-Narasimhan and Lawrence, 2012;
Palanski et al., 2015).
In sum, there is substantial evidence to suggest that the
alignment between an individual’s stated intentions and
her subsequent actions enhances the evaluation of that
individual by her followers, increasing her perceived
trustworthiness as a reliable exchange partner. We thus
argue that stakeholders who provide firms with essential
resources expect consistency between a firm’s stated
intentions or plans and its actions, and react positively to
the presence of strategic integrity and negatively to the
lack thereof. In the following, we develop this idea more
systematically by presenting a formal definition of
strategic integrity, elaborating on its nature, and
delineating it from related concepts.
Strategic integrity
Construct definition
We define strategic integrity as the extent to which an
organization’s strategic actions are aligned with its prior
strategy communication. This definition involves three
core components namely, the object of the evaluation
(the firm), the attribute of the evaluation (the alignment
between strategy communication and subsequent strategic
actions), and the identity of the evaluators or raters (the
stakeholder groups concerned) (Rossiter, 2002). A
visualization of this conceptualization of strategic
integrity is provided in Figure 1.
Strategic integrity focuses on the collective of agents
representing a firm with respect to strategy formulation,
communication and implementation. The strategy
literature regards these activities as core responsibilities
of a firm’s top management (Hambrick and Mason,
1984), and of the staff charged with supporting them
(Zerfass et al., 2014). The latter group is typically based
in the corporate development and/or corporate
communications departments (Dolphin and Reed, 2009);
in some firms, strategy development is also integrated
with the finance and/or investor relations departments
(Dolphin, 2004). Together, they serve as the firm’s
spokespersons (Elsbach, 2003).
Stakeholders expect information on central aspects of a
firm’s strategy, comprising externally oriented, specific,
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and observable competitive moves initiated by a firm to
enhance its relative competitive position (Chen, 1996).
In diversified firms, corporate strategy decisions (e.g.,
with respect to major capital investments and divestments,
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), joint ventures and
alliances) which shape the firm’s overall business
portfolio are taken by the corporate center, whereas
strategic decisions that affect the individual business units
(e.g., on product design and pricing) tend to be taken at
that level (Porter, 1989). Corporate strategy decisions on
a firm’s overall portfolio represent significant resource
commitments that may have considerable effects on firm
value (Bowman and Helfat, 2001).
Firms use a number of communication channels to
announce intended strategic actions. These include
annual reports, presentations to and meetings with
analysts, press releases and press conferences, interviews,
and increasingly corporate websites and different types
of social media (Higgins and Diffenbach, 1989a;
Arvidsson, 2012). Today, firms are expected to provide
significant amounts of forward-looking information
(Marston, 2008).
A firm’s strategic actions are aligned with its strategy
communication to the extent that they are consistent with
the intended actions previously announced. We argue that
evaluators ascribe strategic integrity to firms based on
their comparison of prior communication and subsequent
actions. This assessment is likely to focus on a limited set
of parameters that describe what, in essence, a firm intends
to do. For example, publicly quoted companies frequently
communicate in which geographies they intend to be
(more or less) active, and whether they seek to grow or
shrink a particular line of business. In the presence of
sufficient information, stakeholder groups should
generally be able to assess whether a firm’s actions are
consistent with their stated intentions in terms of these
basic parameters.
Construct delineation
The construct of strategic integrity differs from several
others discussed in the literature. Strategic credibility
refers to an evaluation of the content of a firm’s strategy
by its stakeholders (Higgins and Diffenbach, 1989b), to
whether it ‘make sense’, given its context. Whereas
strategic integrity assesses the alignment between strategy
communication and strategic action, strategic credibility
refers to the fit between a firm’s strategy and its
environment in the eyes of particular stakeholders i.e.,
whether the strategy is considered to be a ‘good’ one.
Strategic consistency refers to the continuity between
different strategic actions over time. The more consistent
strategic actions are with one another and with prior
strategic investments, the more useful they tend to be in
generating competitive advantage (Rindova and
Fombrun, 1999). Strategic consistency thus entails an
evaluative comparison of different strategic actions.
Lamberg et al. (2009) in turn refer to strategic consistency
as the alignment of a firm’s actions with changes in the
businesses environment and with its own history. Their
use of the notion of strategic consistency is thus similar
to the notion of strategic credibility discussed above.
Strategic coherence denotes the alignment of strategic
actions across levels and functions (Nath and Sudharshan,
1994). Similar to the case of strategic consistency,
strategic coherence refers to an evaluation of alignment
of several firm strategic actions. Strategic coherence
differs from strategic consistency in that it has a stronger
internal focus, and it addresses the alignment of actions
at a particular point in time.
To summarize, the notion of strategic integrity is a
novel construct that bridges a firm’s communication
of strategy and its subsequent implementation. It is
thus of particular importance in the context of major
strategic initiatives. In the following, we use the example
of corporate portfolio restructuring in order to explore
Figure 1 Illustration of the strategic integrity construct
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the importance of strategic integrity from the perspective
of a specific key stakeholder group of a firm namely,
its investors.
Strategic integrity in the context of
corporate restructuring
Corporate restructuring denotes ‘a broad range of
transactions, including selling lines of business or making
significant acquisitions, changing capital structure
through infusion of high levels of debt, and changing
the internal organization of the firm’ (Bowman and
Singh, 1993: 6). In corporate restructuring initiatives,
firms reshape their business portfolios through mergers,
acquisitions, divestitures and other types of corporate
transactions in order to implement a strategy of
diversification or de-diversification, of horizontal or
vertical (dis-) integration, or of internationalization.
Corporate restructuring thus fundamentally affects a
firm’s scope and future performance (Markides, 1995).
Due to their material significance and visibility,
corporate portfolio restructurings offer ideal situations
for studying strategic integrity from the perspective of
particular stakeholder groups. In most jurisdictions, firms
listed on the stock market are required by law to publicly
announce their intention to pursue transactions above a
certain size threshold. Large-scale portfolio restructurings
trigger significant communication before, during, and
after the execution of the transactions involved. Finally,
portfolio changes are distinct, easily identifiable and
traceable strategy actions, thus allowing researchers to
establish clear links between specific events and
stakeholder reactions.
Due to their effects on capital market valuations,
corporate restructuring activities are closely monitored by
investors and other market participants. Companies thus
communicate proactively with their investors in order to
achieve and maintain favorable valuations. Research has
shown that financial analysts and institutional investors
are among the groupswithwhom companies communicate
most frequently about their strategies (Higgins, 2002),
and that strategy communication and event-specific
communication may influence interpretations of actions
by stakeholders (Wagner et al., 2009).
As institutional stockholdings have increased over
time, so has their influence on stock prices. Companies
have reacted to this development with increasing
investments in their investor relations functions (Rao and
Sivakumar, 1999). With respect to interpreting company
strategy and behavior, analysts have been recognized for
their prominent role in shaping investor reactions to
particular events (Kuperman, 2002; Fogarty and Rogers,
2005). Strategic integrity is particularly important in this
relationship because analysts spend considerable time
analyzing the strategy communication of firms. They are
thus in a strong position to recognize any (mis-)
alignments between a firm’s strategy and its subsequent
strategic actions (Ramnath et al., 2008).
A number of empirical studies have analyzed the
interaction between firms and financial market
participants (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005; Westphal and
Graebner, 2010). Masawi et al. (2013) found that
communication influences financial markets. Clarity,
intensity, and internal consistency of communicated
strategy has been shown to enhance IPO performance
(Gao et al., 2008). Trautmann and Enkel (2014)
have investigated success factors for communicating
innovation to analysts. In sum, empirical studies have
demonstrated the importance of communication with
financial market participants.
We argue that strategic integrity will lead investors to
attribute a reputation for trustworthiness and
implementation orientation to the firm, thus raising their
evaluation of the firm concerned. Investors dislike
‘surprises’ in the form of unexpected strategic moves that
firms take out of line with their stated strategy. In contrast,
consistency between stated intentions and subsequent
actions demonstrates reliability, which is valued in the
investor community (Higgins, 2002). Strategic integrity
should therefore trigger increased demand for a firm’s
stocks and consequently, higher capital market valuations.
Data and methods
To illustrate the importance of strategic integrity, we
studied the alignment between strategy communication
and strategic actions at Bayer, using an event study of
the capital market consequences of Bayer’s portfolio
restructuring between 1999 and 2006.
Case selection
Our longitudinal research design required us to follow a
company with a well-documented strategy
communication and a history of portfolio restructuring
actions. Bayer provided a suitable setting for this
approach. Bayer is a globally active, German life sciences
company with annual sales of more than 46 billion euros
and 115,000 employees world-wide (Bayer, 2016). Bayer
stocks are included in the German DAX 30 and the
EUROSTOX 50 indices. Bayer’s size and the high
transaction intensity in its sector, results in a sufficient
number of corporate transactions for analyzing the capital
market implications of strategic integrity. Furthermore, as
a publicly traded firm Bayer is required to announce
events such as mergers and acquisitions that have a
fundamental impact on its structure. Bayer has repeatedly
won the German Investor Relations Award by the German
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Investor Relations Association for its comprehensive
investor relations activities.
We limited our analysis to the period from 1999 to
2006 for two reasons. First, it allowed us to exclude the
turmoil created in the mergers and acquisitions markets
by the financial crisis beginning in 2007. Second, the
time frame represents a distinct phase in Bayer’s
corporate history. During these years, Bayer’s overall
corporate strategy was to move away from its traditional
chemicals business and strengthen their healthcare and
agriculture divisions with a focus on North America,
and focus its polymer activities on Asia (Bayer, 2016).
Bayer’s corporate restructuring involved nearly 100
sizeable corporate transactions, including several
‘mega-deals’, which fundamentally changed the firm’s
structure. For example, in 2005 Bayer spun-off its former
core business of chemicals and its polymers unit forming
the new and independent company of Lanxess,
accounting for more than 6.3 billion euros of sales and
close to 20,000 employees. In 2006, it acquired
pharmaceuticals company Schering for almost 17 billion
euros (Bayer, 2016). As shown in Figure 2, Bayer’s
corporate portfolio changed significantly from 1999 to
2006. The case of Bayer allows us to observe strategic
integrity of specific corporate restructuring events in the
context of implementing a well-documented overall
corporate restructuring strategy.
Data
We used data from several sources in order to assess
strategic integrity. First, in order to establish Bayer’s
strategy communication, we collected all written strategy
documents published by Bayer in the eight years from
1999 to 2006 that were obtainable on the company’s
website, including annual and quarterly reports, ad hoc
messages, strategy presentations, and documents used in
conference calls and investor conferences. In total, we
analyzed 234 documents containing more than 5,000
pages of text. In contrast to oral statements about strategy,
published documents are available to the entire investor
community (as well as to other stakeholders), and may
therefore be perceived as binding for moral or even legal
reasons. We used these documents to identify intended
strategic actions.
Second, in order to gather data on Bayer’s strategic
actions, we used Factiva and searched the press database
LexisNexis for press reports and other types of media
coverage of portfolio transactions by Bayer from 1999 to
2006. We found reports on 53 acquisitions and 45
divestments for a total of 98 strategic actions for the period
under investigation. We dropped 18 events from the
sample as information on them was insufficient. Our final
sample contained 80 events, including 45 acquisitions and
35 divestments. The frequency of these actions varied
over time, with an average of 2.5 portfolio restructuring
actions per quarter (see Table 1). We used the Datastream
database to collect stock market data for the respective
period. These data capture investors’ reactions to Bayer’s
strategic actions.
Assessing strategy communication and strategy integrity
In order to assess the alignment between Bayer’s strategy
communication and its subsequent strategic actions, all
information was coded by two researchers working
independently. The inter-rater agreement was above
90% in all but one coding category, and all indicators
commonly used for assessing inter-coder reliability
(Lombard et al., 2002) were at acceptable levels in all
categories. Disagreements were further reduced in
discussions between the two coders after the exercise
Figure 2 Development of Bayer’s corporate structure
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was completed, resulting in an overall agreement of
more than 95%.
In order to establish Bayer’s strategy communication,
all text fragments containing statements about the
company’s intentions regarding its portfolio restructuring
were coded along five dimensions: (1) type of action
(acquisition or divestment); (2) type of statement
(action planned or not planned); (3) division affected
(Bayer had four divisions in 1999 which it reorganized
into three, with a spin-off of the Chemicals part in
2004/2005; see Figure 2); (4) geography affected; and
(5) product group affected. If a statement indicated that
an acquisition was planned and a divestment was not
planned (or vice versa), two codes were created. If a
statement was broad and unspecific (i.e., it would not
mention a division, nor a geography or product focus),
no code was created, in line with the value that analysts
put on specificity in strategy communication (Higgins,
2002). A total of 332 individual codes were created,
capturing Bayer’s communication of its intended strategy.
A significant portion (47%) of the communication on
intended portfolio restructuring actions happened early
during each year, as indicated by a large proportion of
codes in the first quarter, partly due to the fact that Bayer’s
annual reporting season took place in that quarter. The
majority of statements were formulated in a positive
fashion that is, the company communicated what they
intended to do, rather than what they intended not to do.
However, most of the positive statements also implied that
the opposite action was not planned.
We then compared the 80 strategic actions (or ‘events’)
with the codes describing Bayer’s strategy
communication prior to the events concerned.
Specifically, we used the strategy communication from
the same quarter and up to two quarters before the
strategic action took place, corresponding to a time frame
of up to nine months. The reason for using a quarterly
timeframe was that a lot of the communication items were
published without an exact date, but information was
available on which quarter they were published in. We
also ran our analyses with a timeframe of six and twelve
months, with no material change to the results.
The strategic actions were assessed against the strategy
communication codes for the same type of action and
division, and the same product group and geography if
specified. By following this procedure, each event was
compared to up to ten prior strategy communication
codes. We then assigned to each action a score of being
‘aligned’, ‘ambiguous’, or ‘misaligned’ with previous
strategy communication. For 48 events, there were
between one and ten codes all either consistently
indicating alignment or misalignment. These events were
coded as ‘aligned’ and ‘misaligned’ respectively. There
were 13 actions that were aligned with some strategy
communication codes, but misaligned with others, to
which we assigned the overall rating of being ‘aligned’
or ‘misaligned’ on the basis of the majority of statements.
One event had one code each supporting alignment and
misalignment, which we rated as ‘ambiguous’.
Furthermore, for 18 events there was no strategy
communication corresponding to the respective event
within the timeframe of up to two quarters before the
event. These events were rated as ‘ambiguous’.
Analytical methods
In order to analyze the effect of strategic integrity on stock
performance we used an event study methodology, which
is based on the market-adjusted model for the company
and then calculating abnormal returns around the event
date. Abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting the
expected return from the actual return, thus representing
returns earned by the firm over and above the ‘normal’
return (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Event studies are
commonly used to assess the effects of strategy
communication and other important announcements
(Johnston, 2007; Duso et al., 2010; Bergh and Gibbons,
2011). We chose the market-adjusted model (over the
market model) given the fact that Bayer performed
multiple actions over the period we examined. Thus, the
estimation of the market parameters of Bayer will
inevitably include many previous events in the estimation
period, making beta coefficient estimations susceptible to
bias (see also Fuller et al. (2002) for similar arguments).
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) have shown that for
short-run event studies the market model does not
significantly improve estimation, and the market-adjusted
model is preferable (see also Campbell et al., 1997).
Nevertheless, we examined the robustness of our results
(untabulated) by analyzing the market model as well as
the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model, in addition
to the market-adjusted model.
We used the DAX30 rate of return as the index to
estimate the normal return on the Bayer stock within the
event window. We defined various windows in order to
capture the effect of strategic integrity on stock
performance, namely the announcement window (day
Table 1 Acquisition and Divestment Frequency
Year Acquisitions Divestments Total
1999 8 3 11
2000 10 7 17
2001 9 4 13
2002 2 7 9
2003 1 3 4
2004 3 3 6
2005 3 3 6
2006 9 5 14
Total 45 35 80
Note: Events are drawn from Bayer’s annual reports.
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0), the (–1, 0) window, and the longer (–10, +10) window.
These event windows have been used in prior literature
(for example, Travlos, 1987; Datta et al., 1992).
Abnormal returns (ARs) were calculated as follows:
ARt ¼ rt–rm;t;
where r is the return on Bayer at time t and rm,t is the return
on the DAX30 (XETRA) at time t of the event
(acquisition and divestment announcements drawn from
Factiva).
The return on day t is calculated thus:
Pt–Pt1ð Þ= Pt1ð Þ;
and the CAR is the cumulative abnormal return between
the specified days (0), (–1, 0), and (–10, +10). We used
simple returns to calculate performance, which is
preferable in studies using short-term windows (Campbell
et al., 1997). Nevertheless, in untabulated results we also
ran our main results using continuously compounding
returns, with no material change in our results. We then
assessed whether the abnormal returns of strategic actions
rated as ‘aligned’, ‘ambiguous’ and ‘misaligned’ with
prior strategy communication were significantly different
from one another, using bootstrap simulations.
Results
Table 2 provides an overview of the average cumulative
abnormal stock returns. More than 50 per cent of the
events (45 out of 80) were rated as ‘aligned’with previous
strategy communication, whereas 16 events were
‘misaligned’, and 19 ‘ambiguous’. Acquisitions were
‘aligned’ more often with prior strategy communication
Table 2 Number of events and cumulative abnormal returns by alignment level
Alignment level
Event Misaligned Ambiguous Misaligned & Ambiguous Aligned Total Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (4)–(1)
Panel A: At announcement
Acquisitions mean -0.21% -0.28% -0.26% 0.70% 0.46%
median -0.39% -0.14% -0.16% 0.81% 0.22%
n 3 8 11 34 45
Divestments mean -0.75% -0.14% -0.47 1.42% 0.12%
median -0.49% 0.18% -0.05% 1.38% 0.18%
n 13 11 24 11 35
Total mean -0.65% -0.20% -0.41% 0.88% 0.32% 1.53%***
median -0.44% -0.12% -0.16% 0.91% 0.20% 1.35%***
n 16 19 35 45 80
Panel B: (-1, 0)
Acquisitions mean 0.88% -0.19% 0.10% 0.06% 0.07%
median 0.05% -1.02% -0.43% 0.07% 0.05%
n 3 8 11 34 45
Divestments mean -1.05% -0.54% -0.82% 1.31% -0.15%
median -1.07% -0.01% -0.80% 1.37% -0.01%
n 13 11 24 11 35
Total mean -0.69% -0.39% -0.53% 0.37% -0.02% 1.06**
median -0.74% -0.54% -0.54% 0.35% 0.02% 1.09***
n 16 19 35 45 80
Panel C: (-10, +10)
Acquisitions mean -4.46% 1.48% -0.14% 2.00% 1.48%
median -3.16% -0.71% -3.09% 0.29% -0.03%
n 3 8 11 34 45
Divestments mean 0.07% -0.85% -0.35% 0.83% 0.02%
median 0.19% 0.29% 0.24% 2.81% 0.29%
n 13 11 24 11 35
Total mean -0.78% 0.13% -0.28% 1.71% 0.84% 2.49%**
median -0.18% 0.29% 0.17% 0.35% 0.21% 0.53%*
n 16 19 35 45 80
Notes: This table reports Bayer’s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 45 acquisitions and 35 divestitures between 1999 and 2006, using the market-
adjusted model. Panel A reports the abnormal return at the announcement of the event (day 0), Panel B reports the (-1, 0) CAR, and Panel C reports the
(-10, +10) CAR. The last column report a two-sample t-test for the means and a Mann–Whitney test for the medians just for the Total sample.
* ,
** ,
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
8 C.P. Mavis et al.
© 2018 The Authors European Management Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European
Academy of Management (EURAM)
(34 out of 45, corresponding to 76%) than divestments (11
out of 35 i.e., 31%).
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results for the
announcement day. The average (median) abnormal stock
return for all events as seen in column (5) was +0.32%
(0.20%), reflecting a positive evaluation by the capital
market of Bayer’s portfolio restructuring activities during
the 1999–2006 period. The average abnormal returns
were higher for acquisitions (+0.46%) than for
divestments (+0.12%), but the returns were more similar
when using median values (0.22% vs 0.18%,
respectively). These findings are consistent with extant
research showing positive abnormal stock returns for
acquisitions in general (Seth, 1990), and mixed results
for divestments (Brauer, 2006).
By comparing these results to columns (1) to (4), we
observe that this positive result is driven by the ‘aligned’
events. ‘Aligned’ events (column (4)) have a positive
average stock reaction (+0.88%) and are greater in
magnitude as compared to ‘misaligned’ (–0.65%),
‘ambiguous’ (-0.20%), and combined ‘misaligned &
ambiguous’ (–0.41%) events. Results are very comparable
when looking at the median values, too.
The last column in Table 2 reports the differences
between ‘aligned’ and ‘misaligned’ events. We report
these statistics just for the Total sample given that
acquisitions and divestments on their own do not have
enough observations to produce meaningful results.
The difference in means is based on a t-test and the
difference in medians on a Mann–Whitney test. ‘Aligned’
events significantly outperformed ‘misaligned’ events by
1.53% on average (1.34% in medians). These results
provide an initial indication that ‘aligned’ events were
perceived more favorably by the market as compared to
‘misaligned’ events.
Panel B and Panel C present the same analysis, but for
wider event windows. In Panel B, we examined the
validity of our results using a 2-day (–1, 0) window and
in Panel C a 21-day (–10, +10) window. The results from
both of these panels confirm the results outlined in Panel
A, namely that ‘aligned’ events elicited a strong positive
reaction from investors. In addition, the difference
between ‘aligned’ and ‘misaligned’ events was
statistically significant for both means and medians.
Table 3 shows the results from a bootstrap simulation
used to further assess the significance of the results from
Table 2. We focused on the total abnormal returns
(combined acquisitions and divestitures sample) for all
alignment levels. For each alignment level, we randomly
selected y dates (y denotes the total number of events for
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for bootstrap simulations
Misaligned
(1)
Ambiguous
(2)
Misaligned &
Ambiguous (3)
Aligned
(4)
Aligned vs
Misaligned
Aligned vs
Ambiguous
Aligned vs
Misaligned
& Ambiguous
Panel A: At announcement
sample
mean
-0.65% -0.20% -0.41% 0.88%
simulated
mean
0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 1.52%*** 1.07%*** 1.28%***
99% CI (-0.01%,
0.02%)
(-0.00%,
0.03%)
(-0.00%,
0.02%)
(-0.00%,
0.02%)
Panel B: (-1, 0)
sample
mean
-0.69% -0.39% -0.53% 0.37%
simulated
mean
0.08% 0.14% 0.11% 0.10% 1.04%* 0.80% 0.91%**
99% CI (0.03%,
0.13%)
(0.09%,
0.18%)
(0.08%,
0.14%)
(0.08%,
0.13%)
Panel C: (-10, +10)
sample
mean
-0.78% 0.13% -0.28% 1.71%
simulated
mean
0.12% 0.17% 0.16% 0.15% 2.46%** 1.60% 2.01%*
99% CI (0.06%,
0.18%)
(0.12%,
0.23%)
(0.12%,
0.20%)
(0.11%,
0.18%)
Notes: This table reports various statistics from bootstrap simulations based on the time series of Bayer’s abnormal returns. In column (1), we randomly
selected 16 dates between 1999 and 2006 and calculate the CARs for various windows. For column (2) we randomly selected 19, in column (3) 35, and
in column (4), 45. The choice of sample is based on the total number of the events reported for each alignment level as reported in Table 2. We repeated
the process 5,000 times and report the following statistics from the simulated distributions; simulated mean is the average CAR, and 99% CI is the 99%
confidence interval of the mean. Sample mean reports the CARs as obtained from Table 2. The last three columns of the table report two-sample t-tests
of the two corresponding groups, taking into account the simulated mean of the bootstrap distribution. Panel A, B, and C report the statistics for the
announcement (day 0), (-1, 0), and (-10, +10) event windows.
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that alignment level; for example y = 45 for the ‘aligned’
subsample) between 1999 and 2006 and calculated the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the desired event
window. We performed 5,000 iterations and repeated this
process for all alignment levels and event windows. All
panels report the sample mean (the average of the
corresponding alignment level), which is directly
contrasted with the simulated mean (the average CAR of
the simulated bootstrap distribution as described above).
99%CI is the 99th confidence interval of the mean of
the distribution.
In column (1) of Table 3, the simulated mean is 0.00%
with a confidence interval of (–0.01%, +0.02%), whereas
the actual sample mean is –0.65%. Therefore, we have
99% confidence that the true mean of the population lies
between –0.01% and 0.02%. Therefore, the corresponding
mean value in Table 2 (–0.65%) shows that ‘misaligned’
events were perceived quite negatively by the market.
Similarly, if we look at column (3) (‘aligned’ events),
the 99% confidence interval is (–0.00%, +0.02%),
but the sample mean is 0.88%. Therefore, we conclude
that ‘aligned’ events were indeed perceived more
favorably by investors, whereas the rest of the events
were perceived negatively.
We used the simulated mean statistics in order to
test the significance of the results shown in Table 2.
Instead of contrasting the average values of each group
(as we did in Table 2), we adjusted each sample mean
by subtracting the simulated mean. The final three
columns of Table 3 report these new differences between
these groups. ‘Aligned’ events significantly outperformed
all other events by a margin of between 1.07%
(vs ‘ambiguous’) and 1.52% (vs ‘misaligned’). In Panels
B and C we used wider event windows, finding
similar results.
In order to shed further light on the importance of
strategic integrity, we were interested in Bayer’s
communication strategy with respect to the announcement
of particular strategic actions. We collected all press
statements on actual portfolio restructuring actions Bayer
published in the seven years from 2000 to 2006 from the
company website. The period is one year shorter than that
of the collected strategy communication and strategic
actions, as Bayer did not publish press statements before
the year 2000 on their website. Consequently, we
excluded actions from the year 1999 for from further
investigations. Within the 2000–2006 period, our data
set contains 68 portfolio restructuring events. Bayer
provided detailed press statements on 36 of these 68
events, corresponding to a coverage rate of 53%. The
documents containing the event-specific communication
have a length of up to five pages, with the average
statement being two to three pages in length. We coded
each action with a dummy variable ‘coverage’, indicating
whether an additional detailed press statement
accompanied the action or not. In a second step, we
analyzed each press statement and created a dummy
variable ‘linked to strategy’, indicating whether this press
statement linked an action with the overall corporate
strategy or not. In the sample of 36 events that were
covered with individual press statements, 25 were linked
to the overall corporate strategy and the remaining 11
were not.
Table 4 shows that approximately more than half (36)
of the 68 strategic actions analyzed here were covered
by event-specific communication. In about two thirds
(25) of those 36 cases, the strategic action was explicitly
linked to Bayer’s overall strategy as communicated
previously. The breakdown of the 68 cases by alignment
level yielded three interesting insights.
First, when an action was ‘aligned’ with its overall
strategy, Bayer took advantage of the opportunity to point
this out. Seventeen of the 19 ‘aligned’ actions that were
covered by event-specific communication thus contained
explicit references to Bayer’s strategy that had been
communicated previously. The analysis thus suggests that
Bayer saw reputational value in demonstrating that it
followed the strategy it had devised and communicated.
Second, the majority (12) of the 18 ‘ambiguous’ actions
was covered by event-specific communication, but in
seven of these twelve communications, the company did
not relate the action back to the strategy communicated
previously. Thus, Bayer sought to explain ‘ambiguous’
strategic actions, in order to create persuasive rationales
for them that would satisfy investor expectations.
However, there were also five ‘ambiguous’ events that
were reconciled as being in line with corporate strategy;
these were divestments in the Agriculture, Polymers,
Chemicals, and Healthcare divisions. For example, in
2004 Bayer sold its blood plasma operations to two US
financial investment firms, Cerberus and Ampersand. In
the official press statement, Bayer’s CEO explained that
the divestment was part of the strategic reorganization
within the Healthcare division, focusing on consumer
care, patented human and veterinary medicine and
diagnosis systems. In Polymers, Bayer divested
Walothen, a manufacturer of polypropylene films based
in Northern Germany. In the corresponding press
statement, Bayer said that this action was in line with its
overall strategy of streamlining its portfolio of non-core
activities. A similar rationale was provided for
the divestment of its household insecticide business
in the Agriculture division. Overall, the evidence suggests
that the company took pains to explain ‘ambiguous’
strategic actions to investors, either by portraying them
as being in line with its corporate strategy, or by providing
another rationale for them.
Third, about two thirds (9) of 14 strategic actions that
were rated as ‘misaligned’ in our analysis, were not
covered by event-specific communication. In other words,
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when an action was clearly misaligned with what the
company had previously announced, Bayer tended to let
the ‘facts speak for themselves’, rather than to construe
explanations for such mismatch. There were some
exceptions to this general rule, however. Specifically,
Bayer offered event-specific communication on two
divestments of generics businesses in Bayer’s Healthcare
division in 2002 that we had rated as ‘misaligned’ with
Bayer’s overall strategy of growing this division. The
explanations that Bayer provided revolved around their
aim to focus less on generic and more on patented
pharmaceuticals. In its statements, the company thus
argued that they saw these divestments as being in line
with their overall strategic goal.
Robustness checks
For event studies with large companies (which often have
multiple events taking place in a given time period),
confounding events can seriously affect the estimation of
abnormal returns (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), thus
requiring the choice of a short window for estimating
abnormal returns. Even though in our main analysis (see
Panel A in Tables 2 and 3) we used day 0 (announcement
day) as the event window, we performed two additional
test in order to alleviate any concerns regarding the effect
of confounding events. First, we examined whether Bayer
had issued earnings statements around the acquisition and
divestment dates which could be biasing the results
reported in the previous section. We found that around a
21-day (2-day) window surrounding our events Bayer
had issued a quarterly earnings statement in 19 (3) cases.
Our results in the previous section remained similar in
sign and significance when we excluded these
observations from our sample. Second, we identified
events that were overlapping during the reported event
periods. For example, four events were announced a day
after another event and eighteen events overlapped during
our longer window. None of the events were announced at
the same time. When we excluded these overlapping
observations our results were similar, although in some
cases they lacked statistical significance due to the
reduction in sample sizes.
Furthermore, we used different models to estimate the
abnormal return of the events. First, we used the market
model, where alpha and beta were calculated using an
estimation window of (–120, –30) days, obtaining results
consistent with our base case reported in Table 2. We
also ran the event study for different estimation windows
of (–90, –30) and (–60, –30) days, which did not change
the results materially. Second, we used the Fama and
French (1993) 3-factor model, to account for the size
and market-to-book factors, without a material change in
the results. Finally, we re-ran our base results in Table 2,
using continuously compounded returns (i.e., log(Pt/Pt-
1)) instead of simple returns. Our log results were
consistent with our base results.
Discussion and conclusions
Summary and theoretical implications
In this paper, we introduced the construct of strategic
integrity, denoting the pattern of alignment between a
firm’s communicated strategy and its subsequent strategic
actions. We explicated this construct in the context of a
firm’s communicated and actual portfolio restructuring
actions. Using data on German life sciences company
Bayer, we find that the investor community notices and
appreciates alignment between strategy communication
and strategic actions, as indicated by the positive
abnormal stock market returns of announcements of
strategic actions that were aligned with prior strategy
communication. In contrast, the announcement of
misaligned and ambiguous strategic actions carried
negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, our analysis
suggests that Bayer pursued communication strategies in
order to relate their portfolio restructuring actions back
to its overall strategy, and to emphasize that its actions
Table 4 Overview of coverage of strategic actions with event-specific communication
Alignment level
Misaligned Ambiguous Misaligned &
Ambiguous
Aligned Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Event covered by specific communication of which: 35.7% (n = 5) 66.7% (n = 12) 53.1% (n = 17) 52.8% (n = 19) 52.9% (n = 36)
Strategic action explicitly linked previously
communicated strategy
21.4% (n = 3) 27.8% (n = 5) 25.0% (n = 8) 47.2% (n = 17) 36.8% (n = 25)
Strategic action not linked to previously communicated
strategy
14.3% (n = 2) 38.9% (n = 7) 28.1% (n = 9) 5.6% (n = 2) 16.2% (n = 11)
Event not covered by specific communication 64.3% (n = 9) 33.3% (n = 6) 46.9% (n = 15) 47.2% (n = 17) 47.1% (n = 32)
Total 100.0% (n = 14) 100.0% (n = 18) 100.0% (n = 32) 100.0% (n = 36) 100.0% (n = 68)
Note: This table reports Bayer’s communication strategy with respect to the announcement of particular strategic actions.
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were aligned with that strategy, or otherwise explain any
inconsistencies. Bayer thus appeared to value strategic
integrity in anticipation of the stock returns that would
accrue from it. Overall, these results provide promising
evidence on the usefulness of strategic integrity as a
construct of relevance for research and practice.
We believe that our approach bridges several strands
of literature that are often disassociated from one
another. First, we contribute to the debate on the use of
language, rhetoric and the role of discourse, in
establishing legitimacy (Sillince and Suddaby, 2008;
Cornelissen et al., 2015). We concur with the argument
that communication is of central importance in this
context; indeed, our empirical analysis has demonstrated
that Bayer communicated its corporate strategy
frequently and intensely to its stakeholders (the 234
documents we obtained from the company’s website
during the 1999–2006 period imply that, on average,
Bayer posted more than one publication containing
strategy-related material per fortnight). Moreover, Bayer
provided significant amounts of communication to
explain and justify is individual strategic actions.
Corporate communication thus plays a key role in
influencing stakeholders (Mahon and Wartick, 2003;
Cornelissen et al., 2006; Bochenek and Blili, 2013; Neill,
2015). At the same time, our analysis also suggests that
explicating its strategy may only be a first step for a firm
to gain the support of its stakeholders. Firms also require
strategic integrity, which is earned by taking actions that
are aligned with its strategy thus communicated. Our
analysis shows that those strategic actions that were
misaligned with Bayer’s communicated strategy carried
negative abnormal returns of –0.65% on average,
significantly different from positive abnormal returns of
+0.88% for aligned actions (see Table 2, Panel A).
Furthermore, despite Bayer’s communicative efforts to
explain actions that were deemed ambiguous, these
actions, too, carried significantly lower abnormal stock
returns than aligned actions.
The importance of acting upon and in accordance with
intentions known earlier is known from other literatures
for example, from marketing (LaBarbera, 1982; Newell
and Goldsmith, 2001). Furthermore, the game
theoretic literature has emphasized the value of credible
commitments in producing positive outcomes in games
involving sequential interactions among players (e.g.,
Sobel, 1985). Credible commitments require the players’
willingness to take actions in line with their stated
intentions, even if those actions might not be their ‘best
actions’ in a corresponding simultaneous-move game
(Ross, 2014). We thus believe that communication alone
is not sufficient for maintaining the willingness of
stakeholders to provide support for a firm. It also requires
strategic integrity in order to establish credibility and a
reputation for reliability and trustworthiness. Such
integrity has been shown to be of importance on the
individual level (Simons, 2002a, b); we demonstrate its
relevance on the organizational level, too.
Furthermore, our paper contributes to the strategy
literature, whose early focus on strategic planning and
strategy formulation has increasingly been complemented
by an emphasis on strategy implementation (Brauer and
Schmidt, 2006). Some approaches even see strategy as
the mere pattern of resource allocation decisions, rather
than as a firm’s stated intentions; see for example the
debate between Mintzberg (1990, 1991) and Ansoff
(1991) about the ‘design school’ of strategy. We concur
with Mintzberg and Waters (1985) portrayal of ‘realized’
strategy as a blend of ‘intended’ and ‘emergent’ elements.
Yet to the extent that a company decides to communicate
its strategic intentions proactively, it also creates
expectations that these intentions are fulfilled. In this
sense, by explicating its strategy fully, a company may
well create a rod for its own back. By reiterating its
strategy frequently, the firm’s top management binds
itself, and ensures that its strategy gets implemented
(Richter and Schmidt, 2005).
Finally, our specification of strategic integrity in the
context of strategy communication to the investor
community is of relevance to the under-researched but
growing body of literature on the investor relations
function (Petersen and Martin, 1996; Laskin, 2009). With
increasingly stringent reporting requirements and
corporate transparency expectations, we believe strategic
integrity will become ever more important.
Implications for practitioners
Our findings have implications for both directors and
managers below board level. Our analysis suggests that
investors are ‘listening’ to their announcements and
positively react to alignment between strategy
communication and actions, yet ‘punish’ firms whose
actions differ from their previously announced intentions.
Executives should thus avoid hasty statements about
which strategic actions a firm intends to take, in particular
if they are uncertain about whether they are able to honor
the implicit or explicit promises thus made. At the same
time, our results also imply that corporate managers can
make active use of corporate communication to shape
the expectations of the investor community. Corporate
directors, who serve as a link between outside
shareholders and the company, can use our approach for
measuring strategic integrity as a tool for reviewing board
effectiveness and the implementation orientation of their
firm (Schmidt and Brauer, 2006).
Limitations and avenues for future research
Our study is subject to limitations that should be addressed
in future work. For example, our emphasis on strategic
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integrity neglects the possibility that there may be
situations when it might make sense for a firm to deviate
from its initial communication, specifically in situations
of high environmental dynamism. A strategy
communicated earlier might not always seem like the best
option at a later point in time (Higgins, 2002). Even if the
initial stock market reaction to a ‘misaligned’ action may
be negative, the action may create firm value in the longer
run. Furthermore, a firm might not want to announce
intended actions, or it may be intentionally vague in its
communication in order to keep competitors in the dark.
In sum, there is a need to define the situational boundary
conditions to our theory on the effects of strategic integrity
in greater detail.
In addition to these conceptual restrictions, the event
study methodology is subject to a number of limitations.
Event studies may be subject to biases e.g., relating to
the choice of the time window (Duso et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, we chose three different event windows
and the results are consistent across all windows. Though
the number of events (80) in our final sample may appear
relatively small, it is quite comparable to those of other
studies (Clinebell and Clinebell, 1994; Meznar et al.,
1994; Johnston, 2007; Konchitchki and O’Leary, 2011).
Furthermore, there is no econometric evidence that event
studies with small samples have larger biases than studies
with larger samples (Ahern, 2009). However, in order to
improve the validity of our results, we constructed a
bootstrap distribution of sample average returns and
showed that the actual average returns were highly
significant. Furthermore, our approach focuses on
situations where actions were taken, while paying less
attention to those parts of strategy statements that were
not followed by actions. Initial empirical evidence
suggests that such decoupling of intention and action
may not necessarily be punished by financial markets
(Zajac and Westphal, 2004), although further research
would help to clarify the relationship.
Finally, our analyses are based on a longitudinal study
of one single firm, raising questions regarding the
generalizability of our results. Although Bayer is a global
firm which was listed on the NYSE during the time period
investigated, it remains an open question whether
the results are representative of other firms. Also, the
coverage with press statements may be lower for firms
that put less effort into their investor relations function.
These firms may not have a comprehensive strategy
communication policy; hence analysts may react less
strongly to ambiguous or misaligned actions from these
companies. Nevertheless, we would expect the direction
of the effect to remain unchanged.
We see many opportunities for further research on the
alignment of companies’ communication and actions, in
particular the following three. First, a firm’s strategic
integrity needs to be assessed among other external
stakeholders, such as customers and suppliers, who are
recipients of strategy communication as well. If even
‘distanced’ financial investors – who can shift their
portfolio with relative ease – react positively to strategic
integrity, then customers and suppliers –who may depend
on companies more heavily – might value it even more
highly. Future work should thus explore the effects of
strategic integrity on measures such as customer
satisfaction and word-of-mouth, supplier loyalty and
the like.
Second, research on strategic integrity can be advanced
by assessing differences in perceived integrity depending
on who communicates an action. A personal statement
made by a firm’s CEO may carry more weight among a
particular stakeholder group than a publication from
support staff in the firm’s investor relations department
(Kuperman, 2003). Third, the choice of communication
channel might affect the strategic integrity ascribed to a
firm. Today, firms use a variety of communication
channels that differ from conventional written documents
published in writing or online. Companies and individual
managers make regularly use of audio-visual media,
tweets, blogs and other non-traditional media for strategy
communication (Eyrich et al., 2008). Unofficial or even
unintentional communication of strategic intentions
through these channels might affect integrity perceptions.
In general, we believe investigations of the links between
communication and strategy (Foreman and Argenti, 2005)
have considerable potential in explaining the core
question of strategy, why some firms perform better
than others.
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